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OF ALL POSSIBLE POLITICAL ACTIONS the voting decision has re­
ceived the most attention from behavioral political scientists. Prob­
ably we have compiled and analyzed more data on candidate 
choice and turnout than on any other form of political behavior. 
Of course,. this heavy emphasis comes as no surprise. The voting 
act is the fundamental political act in a democracy. It is the most 
widespread political act. Furthermore, on the surface, at least, 
the voting act would appear to be one of the simplest (and there­
fore, most understandable) political acts. A heavy scholarly focus 
on the voting act follows naturally from these considerations. 
While our data base expands, however, our theoretical super­
structure remains far from finished. It is fair to say that political 
science has relied chiefly on models rooted in the sociological, and 
later the social-psycho!Ogical tradition.' These models hold that 
0 I wish to acknowledge the assistance of Professor Nicholas Miller, whose 
constructive suggestions greatly improved the exposition of the theoretical 
portion of this paper. Professor Miller suggested the inclusion of Figure 3. 
I also thank Professor Kenneth Shepsle for his comments on an earlier version 
of the manuscript. 
1 Bernard, Berelson, et al. Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1954). Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 
1960). 
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citizens choose their preferred candidate on the basis of long­
term factors such as party identification and enduring group loyal­
ities, and more ephemeral influences such as candidate qualities 
and the issues. Similarly, the decision to participate (i.e. vote) 
depends on psychological variables such as political interest, po­
litical efficacy, sense of citizen duty, and psychological cross­
pressures.2 
In recent years revisionists have questioned the adequacy of 
the mainstream social-psychological model. They argue that cer­
tain components (e.g. issues) always were or have become more 
important than generally believed, while other components (e.g. 
candidate personalities) or long-term forces (e.g. party identifica­
tion) always were or have become less important than generally 
believed.' With V. 0. Key, Jr. the revisionists maintain that the 
voter is a reasonably rational fellow.' 
On the theoretical level the revisionists find allies in scholars 
who advocate "rational choice" explanations of voting behavior. 
Typically, the latter are applications of theories of decision making 
under uncertainty. For example, Downs argues that in two candi­
date plurality elections one supports one's more preferred candi­
date, where preference results from a comparison of the alternative 
social states (i.e., platforms) the two candidates promise to im­
plement.' And one votes if 
pB-c>O (1) 
where 
p � the probability of affecting the outcome 
B � the difference between the citizen's utility for the platform 
of his more preferred candidate and his utility for the 
platform of his less preferred candidate 
c � the cost of voting. 
2 Ibid. In addition, political scientists have found that various demographic 
variables such as age, incorne, race, etc., are weakly related to turnout. 
3 This literature is growing very rapidly. A good guide to it is provided by 
the articles and accompanying citations in the June 1972 American Political 
Science Review. 
4 V. 0. Key, Jr., The Responsible Electorate (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1966). 
5 An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957), esp. 
Chapters 3, 13, 14. 
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The Downsian model is not very satisfactory. If the party differ­
ential is conceptualized broadly enough, the candidate choice pre­
diction is simply that the citizen votes for the candidate he likes 
better. Nor is the turnout aspect of the model convincing. As 
Downs realized, in mass elections one would expect p to be so 
small that the slight costs of voting (time, effort, travel costs, etc.) 
normally will outweigh the expected benefits of doing so. Gordon 
Tullock expresses similar misgivings.' And, indeed, recent presi­
dential elections find 60,000,000 or so Americans voting, a fact not 
very well accounted for by ( 1). 
In dealing with such objections, Downs suggests that rational 
citizens will realize that the consequence of near universal absten­
tion will be the destruction of democracy.' Thus, he argues, ra­
tional citizens will vote in order to insure the larger goal of pre­
serving the system. But his own intellectual camp provides the 
counterargument here. Preserving the system is a classic example 
of a collective good, and voluntary provision of this good runs 
squarely into the problem of collective action as discussed by 
Olson.' 
Riker and Ordeshook attempt to improve the Downsian model 
by blending some social-psychological ingredients into it.' They 
propose that a citizen votes if 
pB-c+D>O (2) 
where D =the fixed benefits of voting. 
Riker and Ordeshook contend that fixed benefits as well as fixed 
6 Toward a Mathematics of Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1967), Chapter 7. I do not wish to imply that ( 1) has no relation to 
reality. Barzel and Silberberg offer some evidence that turnout increases 
with closeness of the election. The cost of voting certainly affects turnout, 
although there are disagreements about particulars. And finally, variations 
in the size of the party differential are associated with variations in turnout. 
The particular predictions implied by ( 1) probably tend to hold, but as a 
total explanation (or even a significant one) ( l ) falls far short. See Yoram 
Barze} and Eugene Silberberg, "'Is the Act of Voting Rational?" Public Choice 
13 (1972), 113-122. Richard Brody and Benjamin Page, "Indifference, 
Alienation and Rational Decisions: The Effects of Candidate Evaluations on 
Turnout and the Vote," Public Choice 15 ( 1973), 1-18. 
1 An Economic Theory, 261�262. 
8 The Logic of Collective Action (New York: Schocken, 1968). 
9 "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting,'' American Political Science Review 
62 (1968)' 25-43. 
THE VOTING DECISION 393 
costs accompany the act of voting. D summarizes these benefits. 
An example of the elements contained in D might be an individual's 
sense of citizen duty. By voting, the citizen fulfills the duty to 
which he has been socialized and thereby experiences a psycho­
logical satisfaction which may outweigh the costs of voting. 
Various critics have expressed uneasiness with the Riker-Orde­
shook reformulation. Empirically, most of the action appears to 
be in the D term.'° So, if citizens vote simply because D out­
weighs c, why bother with decision theoretic models, symbols, 
rational choice terminology and other trappings which add little 
to the standard social-psychological explanation? Logically, if 
p( B) is insignificant, ( 2) may come perilously close to the realm 
of tautology, or at least triviality. 
Despite these problems with the Riker-Ordesbook reformulation, 
I believe that they have made a valuable theoretical contribution. 
At least implicitly they remind us that the voting decision has both 
instrumental and expressive components.11 The Downsian formu­
lation, (1), is purely instrumental: the citizen's vote has value only 
insofar as it helps push his preferred candidate over the top. In 
contrast mainstream political science, at least the older tradition, 
has made us aware of the expressive component of the voting de­
cision. One may vote to express solidarity with one's class or 
peer group, to affirm a psychic allegiance to a party, or simply to 
enjoy the satisfaction of having performed one's civic duty." 
Clearly, in changing (1) to (2), Riker and Ordeshook create a 
hybrid model which includes both instrumental and expressive 
aspects. 
In this paper I will discuss an example of a class of hybrid vot­
ing models which differ in one important respect from the Riker­
Ordeshook model: the expressive payoff varies across strategies." 
1° For example, Brian Barry, Sociologists, Economists and Democracy 
(London' Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1970), 13-19. 
11 David Butler and Donald Stokes have used this distinction in their 
analysis of British voting: behavior. See their Political Change in Britain 
(New York: St. Martin's, 1969), esp. 35�37. 
12 Of course, one might argue that a vote on these grounds is instrumental 
in the expression of solidarity, the affirmation of party allegiance, or the 
satisfaction of civic duty, respectively. The fact remains, though, that a de­
cision to vote on such grounds is not based solely on the immediate instru­
mental grounds of affecting the outcome of the election. 
13 Let me emphasize that the model which follows is "an example of a class .. 
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This contrasts with the Riker-Ordeshook D term which is common 
to all voting strategies. The example I discuss is a hybrid model 
which conceptualizes the Downsian expected party differential as 
an instrumental factor and the social psychological conception of 
party identification as an expressive factor. This simple model 
produces several rather interesting hypotheses. For example, the 
Downs-Riker-Ordeshook hypothesis that turnout increases as close­
ness of the election increases does not hold for all citizens. For 
some the reverse is true. Moreover, the model illustrates an in­
teresting theoretical convergence: the hybrid rational choice model 
produces hypotheses reminiscent of those produced by a theory of 
cross pressures. However, the mechanism underlying the latter 
theory-psychological tension reduction-is completely absent from 
the hybrid model. 
STRUCTURE AND COMPONENTS OF THE MODEL 
The analysis to follow pertains to two candidate plurality elec­
tions. I assume that a citizen acts as if he is an expected utility 
maximizer. He has three possible actions: vote for candidate 1 
(V,), vote for candidate 2 (V2), and abstain (A). In a two candi­
date plurality election there are five mutually exclusive and col­
lectively exhaustive states of nature. These are as follows: 
States Definition 
S, n1>n2+l 
S, n1=n2+1 
s, n1=n2 
S, n1 =n2-l 
S, n1<n2-l 
Description 
C1 wins by more than one vote regard­
less of the citizen's vote 
C, wins by exactly one vote without the 
citizen's vote 
cl ties c:! without the citizen's vote 
C, loses by exactly one vote without the 
citizen's vote 
C1 loses by more than one vote without 
the citizen's vote 
as stated in the text. I am not claiming that this model is a complete model 
of voting. Rather it is a stripped down model which contains only two 
factors. It is perfectly possible to expand the model to include other variables, 
but the number of voter types to be analyzed proliferates rapidly with each 
additional variable. Even this stripped down model, however, illustrates the 
main characteristics of the class of hybrid models. 
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where C1 =candidate i, i = 1, 2 
n1 �the number of votes for C, exclusive of the 
citizen under consideration 
Assume that citizens have subjective probabilities p,, . . .  , p, de­
fined over S1, . . .  , S5. Thus, p2, Ps and p4 constitute the citizen's 
estimate of a very close election. 
Define the citizen's party differential as B � [U ( C,) -U ( C,) ], 
i.e. the difference between the utility for the platform of candidate 
1 and the utility for the platform of candidate 2. In the event of 
a tie assume the citizen expects B / 2. Consider Figure 1. 
Assuming that the pa1.ty differential, fixed benefits and fixed 
costs are additive, Figure 1 yields the Riker-Ordeshook formulation 
(2) if c>O, D>O, and the Downsian formulation ( 1) if c>O, D�O. 
Action V, dominates action V, if the citizen is not completely 
indifferent between the candidates, and the citizen votes if 
EU(V,)>EU(A), which implies 
B [(p,+p,)2-c+D]>O (3) 
In the analysis to follow I will define the net fixed benefits of 
voting, N, as N�D-c. Thus, N will summarize the fixed costs 
and fixed benefits of voiting as discussed by Downs and Riker­
Ordeshook. Clearly N may he positive, zero or negative, and the 
larger is N, the greater the incentive to vote, ceteris paribus. 
Additionally, however, I will introduce another expressive factor: 
the utility or disutility of satisfying or violating one's party allegi­
ance. Some political scientists have argued that party identifica­
tion is a deep-seated psychological tie relatively independent of an 
individual's issue positions." One need not hold this relatively 
FIGURE 1 
DowNs-RIKER-0RDESHOOK VERSION OF THE VOTER DECISION PROBLEM 
s, s:! s, s, s, 
v, B-c+D B-c+D B-c+D B/2-c+D -c+D 
v, B-c+D B/2-c+D -c+D -c+D -c+D 
A B B B/2 0 0 
14 The American Voter, Chapter 6. But, cf. Arthur Goldberg, "Social De­
terminism and Rationality as Bases of Party Identification," American Political 
Science Review 63 ( 1969 ), S-25. 
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extreme position to recognize that party identification seems to 
capture something more than just an individual's current issue 
stands, something at least in part expressive rather than purely 
instrumental. Thus, I postulate that a vote which affirms an in­
dividual's party identification produces some psychic satisfaction, 
a>O, while a defection from party identification produces some 
psychic cost, d>O. Define a partisan as a citizen from whom a>O, 
or d>O, and define an independent as a citizen for whom a=d=O. 
As an expressive factor, attaining a or suffering d depends only on 
the action chosen, not on the state of nature which holds. But, in 
contrast to the Riker-Ordeshook D term, the new expressive factor 
is not identical for both voting strategies. This aspect of the model 
will produce several very interesting results. 
Clearly, we can now make a distinction between two classes of 
citizens. The first class, consistents, contains those whose party 
identification and party differential are mutually reinforcing-their 
party offers the more attractive platform. (Independents are a 
degenerate case of consistents.) The second class, the cross-pres­
sured, contains those whose party identification and party differ­
ential conflict-their party offers the less attractive platform.'' 
To be more precise, consider Figure 2. 
FIGURE 2 
VOTER DECISION PROBLEM-HYBRID MODEL 
s, s, s, s, s, 
v, B+a+N B+a+N B+a+N B/2+a+N a+N 
v, B-d+N B/2-d+N -d+N -d+N -d+N 
A B B B/2 0 0 
In Figure 2 I assume without loss of generality, that Candidate 1 
is the candidate of the citizen's party. Then, if B>O, the citizen 
is consistent; if B < 0 the citizen is cross-pressured (unless he is an 
independent) . In the remainder of this paper I will compare the 
theoretically expected and empirically observed voting behavior of 
consistent and cross-pressured citizens. 
11> Note that this conceptualization defines cross-pressures as an inconsistency 
between the expressive and instrumental components of the voting decision. 
I take no position on the question of inconsistency within the instrumental 
factor (party differential). As yet the model takes the party differential as 
given; how it is calculated is a separate question. 
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ANALYSIS 
Considering first the consistent citizen one sees that the decision 
for whom to vote is trivial. Strategy V, dominates strategy V, so 
long as the citizen is not both an independent and a complete in­
different about the issues, excluding this degenerate case: 
H -1: consistent citizens vote for the candidate of their own 
party if they vote. (Independents vote for the candi­
date favored by the party differential.) 
The turnout predictions are the usual ones. A consistent citizen 
votes if EU ( V,) >EU (A) which implies 
[a+(p,+p,)� +N]>O (4) 
Thus 
H -2: The greater the fixed benefits of voting the more l
ikely
is a consistent c.itizen to vote. 
H-3: The greater the party differential, the more likely 
is a
consistent citizen to vote. 
H -4: The greater his expectations for a close election, th
e
more likely is a consistent citizen to vote.
H -5: The more partisan he is, the more likely is a consiste
nt
citizen to vote. 
Hypotheses 2-4 express the Downs-Riker-Ordeshook conclu
sions.
Hypothesis 5 is supported in the large by common data from
 voting
studies." Note that from ( 4) completely indifferent indepe
ndents
(B=O, a-0, d=O) vote only if N>O, i.e. that fixed benefits of voting
exceed the fixed costs.
Now consider the decision problem of the cross-pressured citize
n.
He votes for the candidate of his own party rather than that of the
opposition if EU ( V,) >EU ( V,) which implies
B
[a+d+ (p,+p,) 2+p,(B) ]�O
(5) 
Expression ( 5) suggests three hypotheses about the candidate 
choice decision of the crosswpressured citizen. Two of these are 
commonsensical, the third is a little less so. 
16 Philip Converse, "The C!oncept of a Normal Vote," in Angus Campbell et 
al., Elections and the Political Ordu (New York, Wiley, 1966), Chapter 2. 
398 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 38, 1976 
H - 6: The more partisan a cross-pressured citizen, the more 
likely he will -remain loyal to his party if he votes. 
H -7: The greater the party differential, the less likely is a 
cross-pressured citizen to support his own party if he 
votes. 
H -8: The greater his expectations for a close election, the 
less likely is a cross-pressured citizen to support his 
own party if he votes. 
(Hypotheses 7 and 8 follow from the fact that B<O for cross­
pressured citizens.) Hypothesis 6 is consistent with existing data 
about cross-pressured citizens.11 Hypothesis 7 seems eminently 
plausible given that the issues favor the opposition. Hypothesis 8 
is rather interesting. It asserts that closeness of the election affects 
the decision for whom to vote as well as the decision whether to 
vote at all. Even more interesting, though, are the turnout predic­
tions. 
Define as loyalists all those citizens who satisfy ( 5), i.e. all con­
sistents and a subset of the cross-pressured. In complementary 
fashion disloyalists are the subset of the cross-pressured who violate 
( 5). Loyalists vote for their own party if they vote; disloyalists 
defect from their party identification if they vote at all. Consider 
first the turnout decision of the loyalist. The behavior of the con­
sistent loyalists is described by Hypotheses 2-5. The cross-pres­
sured loyalist votes if EU(V,)>EU(A), which implies 
B[a+ (p,+p,)2+N]>O
as in ( 4), but now, however B<O. Thus, the following hypotheses 
hold: 
H - 9: The higher the net fixed benefit of voting, the more 
likely is a loyalist cross-pressured citizen to vote. 
H -10: The more partisan a loyalist cross-pressured citizen 
the more likely he is to vote. 
H -11. The greater the party differential, the less likely is 
a loyalist cross-pressured citizen to vote. 
17 Richard Boyd, .. Presidential Elections: An Explanation of Voting De­
fection," American Political Science Review 63 ( 1969), 498-514. 
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H -12: The greater his expectations for a close election, the 
less likely is a· loyalist cross-pressured citizen to vote. 
In hypotheses 11 and 12 one begins to see the effects of postulat­
ing expressive rewards unique to particular strategies rather than 
common to several as is the Riker-Ordeshook D-term. Evidently, 
the conclusions conveyed by hypotheses 11 and 12 represent a 
large departure from previous formulations. For a loyalist cross­
pressured citizen, the greater the party differential, the more likely 
he is to abstain. Moreover,, the loyalist cross-pressured citizen is 
more likely to stay home when he believes the election is close than 
when he believes otherwise. 
Hypotheses 11 and 12 provide an interesting contrast to hy­
potheses 3 and 4. Another interesting contrast is that between 
the loyalist and disloyalist cross-pressured citizen. The disloyalist 
cross-pressured citizen (i.e. 5 is violated) turns out if EU ( V,) > 
EU (A), which implies 
B [-(p,+p,)2+N-d)]>0 (6)  
Keeping in mind that B<O for this group, the following proposi­
tions hold: 
H -13: The higher the net fixed benefit of voting, the more 
likely is a disloyalist cross-pressured citizen to vote. 
H-14: The more partisan a disloyalist cross-pressured citizen, 
the less likely he is to vote. 
H - 1 5 : The greater the party differential, the more likely is a 
disloyalist cross-pressured citizen to vote. 
H - 16 :  The greater his expectations for a close election, the 
more likely is a disloyalist cross-pressured citizen to 
vote. 
In a nutshell, the disloyalist cross-pressured citizen behaves much 
like a consistent citizen insofar as his decision to participate goes. 
The important exception is that his partisanship discourages rather 
than encourages turnout. 
Although the preceding propositions derive from simple algebra, 
their sheer number may be somewhat confusing. Thus, in Figure 
3 I have attempted to illustrate the geometrical structure which 
underlies them. The figure treats a, d, and N as parameters with 
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values l, 3 and 0 respectively. Also, I make the simplifying as­
sumption that p, = p, = p,. Thus, the bracketed parts of expressions 
4, 5, and 6 may be re-written as 
[a+N +pB] 
[a+d+2pB] 
[-pB+N-d] 
( 4') 
(5') 
( 6') 
The graph then shows how the candidate choice and turnout de­
cision vary as pB varies. 
To interpret, all citizens to the right of the vertical axis (non­
negative B values) are consistents, while all to the left (negative 
B values) are cross-pressured. All citizens whose pB values place 
them above the pB axis on the line representing expression ( 5') 
are loyalists, all below, disloyalists. Finally, consider the "V" 
formed by the intersection of the lines representing expression ( 4' ) 
and ( 6'). Those citizens whose pB values place them on the left 
arm of the V, above the pB axis, loyalist voters, and on the point of 
the V, below the pB axis, nonvoters. Other facts also are evident. 
An increase in N shifts the V upwards, an increase in a shifts it 
northwestwards (roughly, greater range of loyalty, more participa­
tion), while an increase in d shifts it southwestwards (roughly, 
greater range of loyalty, less participation). The reader may find 
it helpful to compare the algebraic and geometric presentations.'' 
To return to the main lines of the analysis, consider for a mo­
ment the empirical implications of the hybrid model. By the use 
of inequality ( 5) one can divide the cross-pressured into two 
groups in which three variables (party identification, party differ­
ential, and closeness of the election) work in exactly opposite 
fashion. The model predicts that the turnout effects of B (Hy-
is The diagrammatic analysis suggests an important caveat to the algebraic 
analysis. Namely, one must limit the range of applicability of Hypotheses 
6-16. To see why, consider the loyal cross-pressured citizen. By H-12 the 
closer the election the less likely he is to vote (graphically, he is proceeding 
southwest towards the tip of the V). But by H-8, the closer the election the 
less likely he is to be loyal (graphically, he is proceeding southwest on the 
line representing expression (5')). But by H-16, if he becomes a disloyalist, 
the closer the election the more likely he is to vote (graphically, he begins to 
proceed northwestward on the V). Thus, the hypotheses must be restricted to 
descriptions of behavior within classes of the cross-pressured. At the bound­
aries of the classes reversals occur. 
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potheses 11and 15), p (Hypotheses 12 and 16), and party identi­
fication (Hypotheses 10 and 14) will be diametrically opposed 
within subgroups of the eross-pressured. Moreover, the effects 
(6') 
FIGURE 3 
GRAPJ!DCAL REl'REsENTATXON OF THE HYBRID MODEL 
(4'): {pB + a+ NJ 
(5'): (ZpB +a+ d) 
(6'): (- pB + N - d) 
I )<, 
-6 -· 
utility (5') 
• 
2 
-2 
-· 
- ----- c;:rQ1111-pr.e1111ured I c::onliatent ---
- dbiQyaliat I loy•ll•t 
- vot• I abat<llxl. I VQte 
4 
a "  l 
d"' 
N•O 
(4') 
•• 
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of B (Hypotheses 3 and 11), p (Hypotheses 4 and 12) and party 
identification (Hypotheses 5 and 14) will be diametrically opposed 
between consistent citizens and one or the other subgrouping of 
the cross-pressured. 
How plausible are the preceding hypotheses? Let us embed 
them in a real political context. In 1964, for example, we know 
that there existed two major classes of cross-pressured citizens. 
Many moderate Republicans could not support Barry Goldwater's 
issue positions. Similarly, some lifelong Southern Democrats found 
Lyndon Johnson's platform less attractive than Goldwater's. What 
does the model suggest about the behavior of these cross-pressured 
voters? Take the Republicans for example. 
The stronger the Republican's party identification the more likely 
was he to remain loyal to Goldwater and to vote if he did (Hy­
potheses 6 and 10). Yet if his distaste for Goldwater's platform 
was so great that he preferred Johnson (i.e. violated 5) then the 
stronger the Republican citizen's party identification the less likely 
was he to vote ( Hypothesis 14) . 
Similarly, the greater Johnson's issue advantage, the more likely 
was the Republican citizen to desert his party and actually to vote 
for Johnson if he did (Hypotheses 7 and 15). But if party loyalty 
was great enough to induce the citizen to prefer Goldwater (i.e. 
satisfy 5), then the size of Johnson's issue advantage worked to 
keep the voter at home on election day (Hypothesis 11). 
Finally, Johnson's huge lead in the polls should have worked to 
keep cross-pressured Republicans loyal (Hypothesis 8) and, sur­
prisingly enough, to vote if they remained loyal (Hypothesis 12). 
But if they preferred Johnson, his huge expected victory depressed 
turnout for him among Republicans (Hypothesis 16). Thus, we 
find something of an underdog effect among cross-pressured citi­
zens: Johnson's huge lead encouraged turnout among those Re­
publicans who preferred Goldwater (Hypothesis 12) and dis­
couraged turnout among those who preferred Johnson (Hypothesis 
16) .19 
Sadly, plausible scenarios do not confirm theories. Let us now 
conduct a more systematic confrontation between theory and data. 
10 In more elaborate models with which I have worked one finds both
bandwagon and underdog effects occurring simultaneously among different 
subclasses of citizens. 
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SOME DATA 
Preference Predictions 
The predictions about voter preferences are contained in Hy­
potheses l, 6, 7, 8. If partisanship, party differential and closeness 
of the election are measurable on some objective scale, these 
hypotheses predict the patterns given in Table 1 for each level of 
partisanship. 
j:J·"_.?'f 
TABLE 1 
PERCENT FAVORING OWN PARTY CANDIDATE 
OVEl\ ()PPOSITION PARTY CANDIDATE 
(THEORETICAL) 
� 
�  Favors 
Closen� Opp?� 
Landslide 
" • { -'.---+----+-Tie 
� 
H-7 
To explain, the right side of the table contains only consistent 
voters for whom voting for their own candidate is a dominant 
strategy. Thus, the light side of the table should contain no 
variation-all entries should be 100 percent. In contrast, the left 
side of the table contains cross-pressured voters. Hypotheses 7 
and 8 specify that support for one's own party should decrease as 
we follow the columns downward and the rows leftward. To take 
account of the suppressed partisanship dimension, party loyalty in 
every cell of the table's left side should increase as partisanship 
increases (the right side entries, of course, should stay constant at 
100 percent). 
Recent election surveys conducted by the University of Michigan 
Center for Political Studies include questions about party identifi­
cation, perceived closeness of the election, and perceived most 
important issues. Thus, the raw materials for a rough test of the 
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hybrid model exist. In this section I will report some preliminary 
results, although they are not as conclusive as I would like." 
Because of the limited number of cases I have collapsed per­
ceptions of closeness of the election into two categories: close, not 
close." Similarly, I have collapsed the measure of the party dif­
ferential into five categories: strongly unfavorable to one's own 
party, moderately unfavorable, neutral, moderately favorable, 
strongly favorable." Finally, because the hypotheses about the 
p.arty differential and closeness of the election seem more crucial
to the model than hypotheses about partisanship (which political 
scientists have studied intensively), I have not differentiated 
strength of partisanship. The analysis considers together all those 
classified as strong, weak or independent Democrats, and only 
differentiates them from the strong, weak and independent Re­
publicans. 
Given all these compromises one can create an empirical table 
with a rough correspondence to Table 1, namely Table 2. 
Table 2 shows a reasonably close correspondence to our prefer­
ence predictions, at least for everyone except 1964 Republicans. 
The prediction of a dominant strategy (rightmost two columns) 
fares rather well. Among 1964 Democrats, for example, 98 percent 
who gave their candidate any issue advantage favored Johnson. 
In general, more than 95 percent of those partisans who gave their 
party a strong issue advantage expressed a preference for their 
.20 The data analyzed in the table were made available by the inter­
nniversity consortium for political research. The data were originally col­
lected by the SRC political behavior program. Neither the original collectors 
of the data nor the consortium bear any responsibility for my interpretation 
of the data. 
21 Respondents' perceptions of closeness of the election are coded into four 
main categories ranging from landslide to tie. I have collapsed these categories 
into not close (win by landslide, or win by quite a lot) and close (win by a 
little, even). I assume that p tends to be lower for the first category of re­
spondents. 
22 The party differential is constructed from the "What do you think is the 
first (second, third) most important problem facing the country today?" 
questions. Answers are assigned scores of 3, 2, I, weighted by the respondent's 
degree of concern over the issue, then assigned a polarity according to which 
party can best handle the problem. The neutral category includes both those 
who have no explicit issue concerns and those for whom pro-Republican and 
pro-Democratic perceptions balance out. Future analyses might try differ­
entiating between the two classes of neutrals. Cf. Footnote 15. 
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TABLE 2 
PERCENT FAVORING OWN' PARTY OVER OPPOSITION, 1964, 1960 
Party DiHerential 
Strongly 
Unfavorable0 Neutral Favorable Favorable 
Democrats 1964 
Not Close 66% 92% 98% 100% 
(32) (123) (207) (49) 
Close 37 90 95 100 
(54) (106) (154) (33) 
Republicans 1964 
Not Close 14 21 65 92 
(42) (33) (40) (24) 
Close 17 48 77 94 
(23) (22) (57) (64) 
Democrats 1960 
Not Close 36 69 67 94 
(22) (35) (18) (35) 
Close 18 66 77 92 
(60) (152) (184) (213) 
Republicans 1960 
Not Close 81 100 90 100 
(16) (24) (20) (23) 
Close 69 82 97 98 
(29) (123) (152) (159) 
° Cross-pressured categories collapsed because of dearth of cases. 
own candidate. Thus, a dominant strategy premised only on party 
identification and the issuies (not candidate qualities) predicts 
rather well. 
Turning now to the cross-pressured side of the table (leftmost 
column) we again find the hypotheses of the model performing 
well. In conformance with Hypothesis 7, support for one's own 
party candidate declines sharply when the party differential favors 
the opposition. More impressively, the rather novel Hypothesis 
8 also finds support in the data. Cross-pressured citizens were 
more inclined to desert their party if they believed the election was 
close than if otherwise. The number of cross-pressured citizens 
is small, but the differences predicted by Hypothesis 8 appear in 
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three of four cases. Differences in the predicted direction of 29 
percent, 18 percent, and 12 percent contrast with a 3 percent differ­
ence not in the predicted direction. Given the original and un­
expected quality of this hypothesis, the data are somewhat en­
couraging. 
In sum, there is nothing in the data which would lead one to 
reject the candidate choice predictions of the model, despite the 
fact that the model does not explicitly include candidate personal­
ities or personal qualifications. 23 
Turnout Predictions 
Tables 3 and 4 illustrate the predicted turnout patterns of loyal 
and disloyal partisans respectively. 
" 
·q.-l'.t,, .-Dfrr. 
"'�e_.IJfi<l.J 
Closeness 
Lan<!,slide 
Tie 
TABLE 3 
PEJtCENT VOTING AMONG LOYAL PARTISANS 
(THEORETICAL) 
Unfavorable Neutral Favorable 
H-l2{f=F=f �}H-4 
� 
H - II 
� H • 3 
Consider Table 3. The right side of the table contains the con­
sistent citizens for whom the traditional predictions hold. Turn­
out increases with size of the party differential and perceived 
closeness of the election (Hypotheses 3 and 4). The left side of 
the table contains loyal cross-pressured partisans. For them the 
opposites of the traditional predictions hold. Turnout should de­
crease as perceived closeness of the election increases and as the 
party differential increases. 
23 On the importance of candidate qualities in Presidential elections see 
Donald Stokes, "Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency," 
American Political Science Review 60 ( 1966), 19-28. 
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PERCENT VOTING AMONG DISLOYAL PARTJSANS 
(THEORETICAL) 
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H-15 
Table 4 contains the disloyal partisans. From Hypothesis 1 
(largely verified above) we expect no cases on the right side of 
the table: none of the consistent citizens should be disloyal. On 
the left side we have the d1isloyal cross-pressured citizens. For 
them, turnout increases as the party differential increases and as 
their perceived closeness of the election increases (Hypotheses 15 
and 16.) 
Needless to say, the crucial contrasts from the standpoint of our 
model are ( 1) that between the left and right sides of Table 3, 
and ( 2) that between the left sides of Tables 3 and 4. If the 
voters who fall in the left side of Table 3 truly are predictably 
out of synchronization with their fellow citizens elsewhere, then 
indeed we would be strongly encouraged to continue investigating 
hybrid models of the type examined in this paper. 
Table 5 presents the data which correspond to the theoretical 
predictions contained in Table 3.24 As is evident, the results are 
24 The dependent variable in Tables 5 and 6 is the percent expressing an 
intention to vote among registered voters. Previous analyses have not differ­
entiated abstention among the legally eligible from that among the legally 
ineligible. Unless one views the turnout and registration decisions as identical 
(which I do not), only abstention among the legally eligible is relevant when 
testing a model such as that under consideration here. Regarding the use of 
vote intention rather than vote report-both have weaknesses. Vote intentions 
overstate turnout. Vote reports are biased towards the winner. I have used 
vote intention because this data is collected at the same time as the data used 
to operationalize p and B, whereas vote reports refer to behavior occurring 
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ambiguous, particularly in view of the small number of cases in 
many cells. 
TABLE 5 
TURNOUT OF LOYAL PARTISANS, 1964, 1960 
Party �tial 
Moderately Strongly 
Unfavorable• Neutral Favorable Favorable 
Democrats 1964 
Not Close 95% 89% 97% 100% 
(19) (93) (178) (41) 
Close 83 92 96 94 
(18) (77) (110) (32) 
Republicans 1964 
Not Close 100 86 100 96 
(4) (7) (22) (22) 
Close 100 90 100 98 
(4) (19) (37) (60) 
Democrats 1960 
Not Close 100 100 88 100 
(4) (16) (8) (25) 
Close 100 99 96 96 
(9) (77) (122) (177) 
Republicans 1960 
Not Close 100 77 100 100 
(9) (17) (16) (23) 
Close 80 96 95 98 
(20) (89) (127) (142) 
° Cross-pressured categories collapsed because of dearth of cases. 
One immediately focuses on the leftmost column to ascertain 
the accuracy of H -12, that cross-pressured citizens who remain 
loyal to their party should be /,ess likely to turn out the closer they 
from 1 to 7 weeks later. In 1960, for example, a citizen interviewed in early 
October might not have expected the election to be as close as it was ulti­
mately. In 1964 a voter who expected a close election when interviewed 
might very well have changed his expectations after seeing the final pre­
election polls. In short, to use vote report as the dependent variable would 
require the doubtful assumption that p and B remain constant from the time 
of the pre-election interview to election day. 
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believe the election to be. Actually, the proposition does not fare 
too badly: it holds for 1964 Democrats and 1960 Republicans and 
at least is not rejected for the other two groups in which all of a 
very small number of cross-pressured voters turn out, close election 
or not. The effects of closeness of the election in the rest of the 
table are so slight and unsystematic, however, that one hesitates 
to put too much stock in the tentative corroboration of H -12. 
As for the other hypotheses, H - 3 tends to hold : turnout in­
creases as one moves from a neutral party differential to one 
favorable to one's party. The evidence for H -11, however, is 
mixed, tending toward the unfavorable : in five to eight rows loyal­
ists are more likely to turn out even if the party differential moves 
from neutral to unfavorable, contrary to the hypothesis. And, as 
mentioned, H - 4, the traditional closeness prediction, is neither con­
firmed nor accepted. 
For the disloyalists the evidence is again ambiguous. Table 6 
contains the data which correspond to the theoretical predictions in 
Table 4. In this table the party groups are combined because of 
the few cases available for analysis. Evidently, this table tells us 
little one way or the other. 
1964 
Not Close 
Close 
1960 
Not Close 
Close 
TABLE 6 
TuRNOUT OF DISLOYALISTS, 
1964, 1960 
Party Differential 
Unfavorable Neutral 
100% 92 
(38) (24) 
90 92 
(30) (25) 
93 33 
(14) (3) 
97 94 
(31) ( 31) 
On the whole these preliminary cross-tabulations are not con­
clusive for or against the turnout part of the model, although the 
slight glimmer of support for H -12 is encouraging. I am hopeful 
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that more extensive analysis of more data sets may yield a clearer 
picture. Even this preliminary analysis raises a few points, how­
ever. 
First, the candidate choice predictions appear to fit the data 
better than the turnout predictions. Perhaps this is simply a func­
tion of noise canceling out with more cases, but it also raises an 
important question. Perhaps the candidate choice and turnout 
decisions are two separate processes rather than one, in contrast 
to the typical assumption of decision theoretic voting models. 
Perhaps a citizen does decide to vote on the basis of such non­
instrumental factors as citizen duty, but then chooses a candidate 
on relatively more instrumental grounds. Such a bifurcated deci­
sion process is less elegant theoretically than a unified one, but 
given the data we must keep an open mind. 
Another point worth noting is the extremely high (intended) 
turnout rate which prevails among registered voters who express 
a candidate preference. Tables 5 and 6 simply do not contain much 
variance to explain. Empirically, intentional abstention among 
eligible voters appears to be a rare form of political behavior. 
Now, given reasonable estimates of p, the expected party differ­
ential for most people should be trivial compared to various ex­
pressive factors such as citizen duty and party loyalty. Thus, the 
real power in a theory of turnout must lie in these expressive 
factors. Expressive rewards might become relatively less important 
as p rises; for example, in low turnout local elections the basic 
expected utility model sans expressive terms should work better 
than. it does on the presidential level." But at any level, expres­
sive factors probably dominate instrumental factors as an explana­
tion of turnout. 
A final implication of the high turnout rates among the registered 
is that the primary explanation for voting participation must be 
pushed back at least to the registration decision. Of course, this 
is not a new argument-Stanley Kelley and his colleagues nicely 
25 In comparing gubernatorial and presidential elections Hinckley, Hofstetter 
and Kessel find party identification to be more important than issues and 
candidate qualifications in presidential elections, while the opposite is true for 
gubernatorial elections. See Barbara Hinckley, Richard Hofstetter and John 
Kessel, "Attitudes and the Vote in Subpresidential Elections," forthcoming, 
American Politics Quarterly. 
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demonstrated it years ago-but it has received too little emphasis.'" 
SoME THEORETICAL CONNECTIONS 
The kind of hybrid model described in the preceding section 
has the potential to create relationships among several heretofore 
distinct areas of research on voting behavior. The model repre­
sents a convergence o:f two strands of theory: the rational calcula­
tion theory common to economics and the cross-pressure, stress­
reduction theory common to psychology. Let me elaborate. 
Take the cross-pressured citizen, one whose party identification 
is inconsistent with his estimated party differential. Such situa­
tions do not trouble economists; one simply adds up the positives 
and negatives and takes the net. As mentioned, however, psychol­
ogists differentiate such decision contexts from those in which all 
relevant factors point in the same direction. According to some 
psychologists, inconsis.tent decision contexts produce (unpleasant) 
psychic stress which the decision maker attempts to alleviate by 
various mechanisms.2r In the case of the voting decision these 
mechanisms include eliminating the conflict by changing one's 
party identification, one's party differential (or both), or with­
drawing from the conflict by losing interest in the election, and 
ultimately failing to participate.28 
Obviously, the model discussed in this article is set within the 
economics tradition. The citizens calculate expected values, maxi­
mize subjective expected utility, and pay no attention to tension 
reduction. Yet several of the predictions of the model would not 
be altogether unfamiliar to researchers working within the psy­
chological paradigm, because surprising kinds of interactions occur. 
We find that for some cross-pressured citizens an increasing proba­
bility that they will decide the election makes them less likely 
to turn out, whereas their non cross-pressured neighbors are stirred 
2G Stanley Kelley, Jr., JRichard Ayers, and William Bowen, "Registration and 
Voting: Putting First 1'hings First," American Political Science Review 61 
( 1967), 359-379. 
27 For a survey of such models see Roger Brown, "Models of Attitude 
Change," in New Direci�ions in Psychology, Roger Brown et al. (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962), 1-86. For an excellent critique and re­
formulation of such models see Peter Sperlich, Conflict and Harmony in 
Human affairs (New York: Rand McNally, 1973 ). 
2s See Sperlich for elaboration .. 
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to greater turnout levels (cf. H - 4 and H -12). Interestingly, 
however, if a citizen is sufficiently cross-pressured to desert his 
party preference, he behaves similarly to the non cross-pressured 
citizen (cf. H-4 and H-16). 
Thus, not only might hybrid economic models incorporate the 
kinds of hypotheses derived from vastly different models, the hy­
brid models might even improve on such hypotheses by specifying 
more precisely the conditions under which they hold. For ex­
ample, the hybrid model specifies that the loyal and disloyal (con­
dition 5) cross-pressured citizens behave completely differently, 
whereas heretofore, their behavior has been lumped together and 
examined simply as the behavior of the cross-pressured." I might 
add that other, more elaborate hybrid models I have examined 
illustrate similar phenomena only with greater complexity: classes, 
subclasses and their accompanying behavior patterns proliferate." 
In short, the hybrid models present a clear opportunity for dis­
ciplinary cross-fertilization, or indeed, paradigm cross-fertilization. 
Of course, some unresolved theoretical questions remain. First, 
we know little about the relationship (which surely exists) between 
various expressive factors, party identification in particular and the 
party differential. Simply treating them as functionally inde­
pendent (as I have done) no doubt ignores an interesting chunk 
of the voting decision. Second, much recent research finds a sig­
nificant role for issues in explaining recent electoral behavior. Yet 
it is difficult to find any great impact of closeness of the election. 
Does the party differential enter the voting decision without being 
discounted for a citizen's personal impact on the outcome?31 
Should we abandon all instrumental variables and focus exclusively 
on the expressive aspects of voting? 
In sum, although hybrid voting models present an opportunity 
to merge the deductive power of economic models and the em­
pirical richness of political science research, there remain important 
20 E.g., Boyd, "An Explanation of Voting Defection." 
so In a model which includes both party identification and retrospective 
voting, for example, there are eight classes of voters, six of which bifurcate 
into subclasses. This model produces 76 predictions over the eight classes of 
citizens. 
ai For a model which considers this possibility see John Ferejohn and 
Morris Fiorina, "The 'Paradox of Not Voting: A Decision Theoretic Analysis," 
American Political Science Review 69 ( 1974), 525-536. 
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theoretical questions for which we have no good answers. But by 
continuing to build models and confront them with data we can 
hope to progress, both by accepting some ideas and by burying 
others. 
